The tax regime for micro-enterprises in Cuba by Ritter, Archibald R.M.
C E P A L  R E V I E W  7 1  •  A U G U S T  2 0 0 0 139
THE TAX REGIME FOR MICRO-ENTERPRISES IN  CUBA  •  ARCHIBALD R.M. R ITTER
C E P A L  R E V I E W  7 1
AUGUST 2000
The tax regime for
micro-enterprises in Cuba
Archibald R. M. Ritter
Department of Economics and




The government of Cuba established a tax regime for
micro-enterprises as soon as it legalized the sector in 1993.
It was designed to function in a difficult context in which a
tax-paying culture did not exist, in which widespread non-
compliance was feared, and in which some micro-entrepre-
neurs’ incomes were high. The tax regime included advance
monthly lump-sum payments, a 10% maximum amount of
total revenues which could be deducted as costs in calculat-
ing taxable income, and an escalating tax schedule. This tax
regime has a number of weaknesses which make it inequi-
table, inefficient and ineffective in revenue generation. The
analysis of this essay indicates that the actual incidence of
the tax is higher than the official tax scale when actual pro-
duction costs exceed the maximum allowable 10%, even ex-
ceeding 100% in some circumstances. The up-front lump-
sum tax payments result in marginal tax rates of 100% for
initial levels of revenue, followed by a rate of 0% until a
level of taxable income is reached where taxes payable ac-
cording to the tax scale are equal to the initial lump-sum
payment. The tax regime discriminates against micro-enter-
prises which have costs of purchased inputs in excess of
10% of gross revenues. It is regressive in that the tax rates
are higher for lower-income micro-enterprises up to a fairly
significant level of true net income. The micro-enterprise
sector also faces a more onerous tax regime than the foreign
and joint venture sector of the economy. From the stand-
point of its impact on the efficiency of resource use, the tax
regime restricts the entry of new firms into the sector and
forces some out of business or underground, thereby reduc-
ing production, raising prices, reducing employment and re-
ducing the generation of income. Finally, to the extent that
firms “go underground,” refrain from starting up, go out of
business, or evade taxes, the government loses revenue. A
number of modifications in the tax regime are suggested in
order to overcome its weaknesses. These changes could help
the sector to make a more valuable contribution to Cuba in
terms of employment and income generation, increased pro-
duction at lower real costs and prices, and increased tax col-
lection.
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I
Introduction
In September 1993, in the depths of the economic crisis
produced mainly by the termination of the special rela-
tionship with the former Soviet Union, Cuba liberalized
self-employment, legalizing many of the economic ac-
tivities which Cubans were already practising in clan-
destine form as part of their personal and family sur-
vival strategies. This permitted the surfacing of many
activities previously conducted in the underground
economy and an explosion of entrepreneurial creativity.
The need for a tax regime to tap the incomes generated
in the self-employment sector was immediately obvious,
and a tax system was adopted in September 1993 and
fully implemented in 1996.
The tax regime, as designed and implemented, has
indeed extracted revenues from the sector. However,
the design of the regime has a number of weaknesses
which reduce its fairness, damage the efficiency of re-
source allocation, and limit its viability. The objective
of this study is to analyse the impacts of the tax regime
for the micro enterprise sector in terms of i) the equity
of income distribution, both within the sector and in
society generally; ii) the efficiency of resource use
within the sector and in the broader national economy
and society, and iii) the viability, effectiveness and
sustainability of the collection of revenues for the gov-
ernment. Following an analysis and evaluation of the
micro-enterprise tax regime, a number of observations
are made on how it could be modified in order to achieve
more fully the objectives of fairness, efficiency and
viability.
Section II gives a review of the emergence of the
micro-enterprise sector, its structure and character. In
section III, the regulatory and policy environment within
which it operates is sketched briefly. The nature of the
micro-enterprise tax regime and the rationale for its de-
sign are presented in section IV, together with the main
quantitative analysis of the regime and its functioning,
while in section V the implications of the tax regime in
terms of equity, efficiency and viability are analysed at
the levels of the individual micro-enterprise, the micro-
enterprise sector, and the broader economy and society.
Section VI then presents a number of specific recom-
mendations for the improvement of the regime from the
standpoint of the three key criteria, and finally, in the
last section, the basic argument is summed up and the
main conclusions are reiterated.
II
The micro-enterprise sector
Despite the nationalization of small and medium-scale
enterprises in the Revolutionary Offensive of March
1968, a small self-employment sector continued to ex-
ist, mainly in the areas of personal services, transport,
artisanal activities, and various types of manufacturing.
In 1988, the number of officially registered non-agricul-
tural micro-enterprises was placed at 28,600, with 12,800
employees, accounting for 1.8% of total employment
(CEE, 1988). The underground economy also included
many micro-enterprise activities, and it continued to
operate on a large scale throughout the 1968-1993 pe-
riod, although its size is virtually impossible to ascer-
tain. In the 1989-1993 period, the volume of clandestine
self-employment increased rapidly as people’s family
survival strategies required that they earn real incomes
beyond those provided by employment in the State sec-
tor, since the latter were increasingly insufficient to ac-
quire the daily necessities which were no longer available
through the rationing system (Ritter, 1998a, pp. 74-76).
The liberalization of self-employment on 8 Septem-
ber 1993 permitted many micro-enterprises to surface
from the underground economy, and permitted new ones
to be legally established. Decree-Law 141 and the ac-
companying resolution legalized 117 types of activities
in six general areas, including transportation, house re-
pair, agriculture-related areas, family and personal ser-
vices, housing services and other activities. By early
1997, a total of 157 types of activities had been legal-
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ized, including “gastronomic services” which encom-
passed street vending and private restaurants or
“paladares”. The legislation of 1993 limited self-employ-
ment to retirees, housewives and laid-off workers, but
excluded professionals and enterprise managers. In time,
professionals who were declared redundant in their pro-
fessional activities were permitted to enter one of the
self-employment categories, but not as self-employed
professionals. In order to enter self-employment, regu-
larly-employed workers in the State sector also required
the permission of their work centres. A variety of other
restrictions on micro-enterprise activity were imposed
as well, as discussed below.
The number of registered and legal micro-enterprises
rose rapidly, reaching 169,098 by December 1994 and
peaking at 208,786 in December 1995 (table 1). The real
level of employment was higher than the number of mi-
cro-enterprises, as family members were frequently em-
ployed, and others often provided some of the inputs
needed by registered micro-enterprises. An estimate by
the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin
America and the Caribbean (ECLAC, Subregional Head-
quarters in Mexico, 1997) placed the total volume of
private sector employment at 400,000 or 9.4% of the total
in 1996, but the number may have been even higher.
Indeed, if one includes informal non-registered part-
time self-employment, the number of self-employed
could reach 30% or more of the labour force. This is
because virtually all families in Cuba, except those re-
ceiving remittances from relatives or having access to
dollars in other ways, such as foreign travel, must supple-
ment their State-sector wage incomes, which are insuffi-
cient for necessary purchases from the higher-priced
agricultural markets and dollar stores, with additional
incomes from a secondary activity.
Registered self-employment and all the other un-
registered self-employment activities have made a valu-
able contribution to the Cuban economy and people. They
have created employment and helped families earn the
incomes necessary for their survival. Although some self-
employment activities have generated high incomes, the
vast majority provide important but modest income
supplements. These self-employment activities consti-
tute a massive school for entrepreneurship. They also
provide basic services and goods to satisfy essential needs
of virtually all Cubans.
The sector also generates large volumes of revenues
for the State through the taxation system and the impo-
sition of fines, which are onerous and apparently fre-
quent. The monthly tax payments made by one dollar-
sector restaurant amount to $US 520,1  or almost 50 times
the average monthly salary in the State sector (214 pe-
sos in 1997), at the exchange rate applicable to Cuban
citizens, namely $US 1.00 = 20 pesos.
1 US$ 300 for the basic monthly payment, plus US$ 100 for an alco-
hol licence, plus US$ 60 for each of the minimum two family em-




December December March January
1994 1995 1996 1998
Approved and registered 169 098 208 786 206 824 159 506
Applications for registration 248 552 390 759 439 268 (268 295)
Applications rejected 10 675 11 519 12 665 (108 789)
Applications withdrawn 65 586 148 491 195 023
Applications being processed 4 193 21 963 8 789
Source: Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social de Cuba, and ECLAC, Subregional Headquarters in Mexico (1997).
TABLE 2
Cuba: Taxes on “gastronomic services”
(Monthly lump-sum payments)
Local economy Tourism sector
(pesos) (dollars)
Sale of food and beverages (“al detalle”) 100.00 —
Sale of home-made food 200.00 100.00
Private restaurants (“paladares”) 400.00 300.00
Sale of alcoholic beverages in private restaurants 100.00 100.00
Tax for the minimum of two family-member employees required in private restaurants 120.00 120.00
Source: Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social/Ministerio de Finanzas y Precios, 1995.
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III
The policy environment
The tax regime for micro-enterprise is but one element
of the general policy environment within which micro-
enterprises operate.
The first element in the policy framework is the
broad range of detailed regulations which affect their
size and operation. The regulatory environment includes
the following general features as summarized in Decreto-
Ley 174 (Gaceta Oficial, 1997):
– prohibition of “intermediaries” of any sort: produc-
ers must sell their own output, sellers must produce
what they sell with no specialized retailers, no whole-
salers, and no producers selling their output to oth-
ers for sale;
– prohibition of self-employment in all professional
areas;
– restrictions on access to markets, with prohibition
of sales to all State entities, except where specifi-
cally permitted;
– prohibition of publicity;
– no access to credit, foreign exchange at the official
parity rate, or directly-imported inputs;
– prohibition of hiring labour outside the family;
– prohibition of associations of own-account work-
ers;
– additional specific limitations on private restaurants,
including a 12 seat maximum;
– inputs can be purchased only in dollar stores and
agricultural markets, where prices are several times
higher than input prices in the State sector, and limi-
tations on the products available;
– additional specific limitations on the sale of food
products in the streets, such as prohibition of the
use of benches, seats or tables;
– prohibition of the use of any location for a micro-
enterprise activity except one’s own home or, in
some cases, a rented market stall.
There are also a variety of regulations on health, sani-
tary and safety conditions for “gastronomic services” and
private transportation. Some regulations in these areas
are of course necessary. However, the definition of the
relevant standards appears to be open-ended, so that
whatever an inspector feels is appropriate could be the
operational standard. The nature of fines and punishments
also appears to permit discretionary punishment for in-
fractions, with the intensity of the punishments being at
the discretion of the relevant inspectors (Gaceta Oficial,
1997). For the 28 micro-enterprise infractions of an eco-
nomic operational character, the fines can be significant
– up to 1,500 pesos, or about seven times the national
average monthly income, although this is perhaps not
unduly onerous for the most lucrative types of self-em-
ployment. This compares with traffic offenses, which
vary from about 2 pesos for an illegal left turn to 10
pesos for a dangerous offence such as running a red light.
The suspension of the licence of an offending micro-
enterprise for a minimum of two years which is a possi-
bility in many cases is a heavy punishment, as it destroys
the livelihood of the offending individual and the rel-
evant family. Some private restaurant owners argue that
the licence suspension is in fact permanent. The pos-
sible seizure of equipment, instruments, machinery or
materials amounts to the confiscation of the accumulated
capital of the micro-entrepreneur, modest though it might
be. Multiple or repeated infractions receive harsher pun-
ishments. If the fine is not paid within 30 days, it is
doubled. If it is not paid in 60 days, the relevant authori-
ties are empowered to seize the offender’s wage, salary,
pension or any other income, then his bank account, and
then any movable property.
The regulations are enforced by a corps of inspec-
tors, including those who enforce the economic regula-
tions and others who enforce the health, safety, environ-
mental and labour regulations. The inspectors can levy
fines, seize equipment and cancel licences immediately
and put any micro-enterprise out of business at any time,
apparently with only minimal chances of a successful
appeal.
These regulations have a variety of economic con-
sequences. First, they constrain the normal growth and
expansion of individual micro-enterprises, condemning
them to a small size. The result of this is that the in-
comes of the entrepreneurs are indeed limited consider-
ably, thus preventing them from providing serious com-
petition to the State-sector enterprises in some areas such
as food services, transport and taxis. Second, the micro-
enterprises operate inefficiently as a result of the eco-
nomic regulations. The prohibition of “intermediaries,”
for example, compels artisans or fabricators of various
products not only to retail their products on a day to day
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basis, but also to find time to produce the products they
sell– and no other products. The prohibition of special-
ized retailers thus wastes the time of the artisans and
reduces the quantity and quality of their production or,
more likely, encourages various infractions of the rules
in daily operations, despite the efforts of the inspectors
to enforce the regulations. The overall result of the regu-
lations is therefore to waste the energies of many of the
entrepreneurs, to lower their productivity, and to reduce
the quality and quantity of their production. The general
impact for Cuba is thus to waste its human energies as
well as its capital and material resources.
Another area where public policy appears to be aimed
at the containment of parts of the micro-enterprise sector
is the competition from State enterprises, which often have
structures of input costs which are only a small fraction of
those faced by the micro-enterprises (Ritter, 1998a).
The general political environment within which the
micro-enterprise sector has operated has been uncertain
since its legalization in 1993.The original legislation in-
cluded a clause which could be used at any time to elimi-
nate parts of the sector (Cuba, Gobierno, 1993). In a
speech in April 1997, Castro criticized the reforms of
1993-94, on the grounds that they generated incomes
“ten times, twenty times, or thirty times those earned by
a worker” and stated that they were implemented: “. . .
never imagining that we would have to learn to live with
them for a period of time that is difficult to predict, and
that depends on many factors” (Castro, 1997). This state-
ment was widely interpreted to mean that the continued
existence of the micro-enterprise sector was being ques-
tioned.
The micro-enterprise sector is also criticized by the
State-controlled press. Articles critical of the sector have
appeared every so often (Lee, 1996; Del Barrio, 1998;
Mayoral, 1995 and 1997; Ricardo, 1998). The press usu-
ally emphasizes the illegalities perpetrated by the sec-
tor, the alleged high incomes received, the evasion of
taxes, and the clear need for stronger enforcement, greater
vigilance and tighter controls.
IV
The tax regime for micro-enterprises
1. Structure of the tax regime
The micro-enterprise tax regime consists of compulsory
lump-sum fees paid each month to the tax authority, the
Oficina Nacional de Administración Tributaria (ONAT),
together with a self-administered correction for the an-
nual tax payments carried out by each micro-enterprise.
A key feature of the system is the 10% maximum allow-
able deduction from taxable income for the purchase of
inputs.
The first element in the tax regime is the monthly
fixed lump-sum payment, which was first imposed in
1993, when Cuba embarked on the first phase of micro-
enterprise liberalization. The Ministries of Finance and
Prices and of Labour and Social Security set minimum
rates, but the Administrative Councils of the municipal
governments are empowered to establish rates above
these minimum levels, with the approval of the relevant
ministries. The rates can be changed every six months,
in January and July. The legislation permits the Coun-
cils to raise the rates if they consider that the incomes of
the micro-enterprises are “excessive,” although what “ex-
cessive” means is not defined (Cuba, Gobierno, 1993).
Here again, the ambiguous character of the law increases
the uncertainty for micro-enterprises. The law permits only
increases, not decreases in the tax rates. This also adds to
uncertainty and makes the system inflexible for micro-
entrepreneurs, who must pay the full fixed lump-sum in
both fat and lean months and years. However, the micro-
entrepreneur may leave the activity at the beginning of
any month, immediately ceasing the monthly payments.
The rates were set at relatively low levels in Sep-
tember 1993, but have been increasing steadily since
then. Especially noteworthy is the distinction between
those micro-enterprises which operate in the dollar
economy and those in the peso economy, the former be-
ing taxed at a rate which is 20 times that of the latter (at
the exchange rate applicable to Cuban citizens).
The second feature of the tax regime is that at the
end of each year, micro-enterprises must pay a tax on
their revenues on the basis of an escalating tax schedule.
They can, however, deduct the total of the monthly fixed
lump-sum payments from the amount of tax owed ac-
cording to this schedule. The procedure is as follows:
(i) The micro-enterprises add up their gross revenues;
(ii) They subtract 10% of the gross revenues (20% in
the case of private transport) as an allowable deduc-
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tion for inputs purchased, in order to arrive at net
taxable income;
(iii) They calculate the tax owing according to the scale
in table 3. The payments are cumulative, with each
component of income falling within each bracket
being taxed at the rate for that bracket;
(iv) They deduct the sum of the monthly lump-sum pay-
ments from the tax owed according to the tax scale
or schedule;
(v) If the amount owed according to the tax scale cal-
culations exceeds the amount already paid through
the monthly lump-sum payments, they must pay tax
equal to the difference;
(vi) If the amount owed is less than the amount already
paid, they do not receive a rebate for the excess tax
already paid.
The official tax scale (table 3) includes one scale for
income and taxes in national currency and another for
income and taxes in US dollars or “convertible pesos.”
The tax scale applies to income net of the 10% of gross
revenues which is the maximum allowable for pur-
chased inputs. The progressiveness of the tax scale for
dollar incomes is not too far out of line with interna-
tional standards. It also seems reasonable from a Cu-
ban perspective. On the other hand, for peso incomes
the scale increases from 5% for the first 3,000 pesos to
50% for the tax bracket for incomes exceeding 60,000
pesos. The peso tax scale does appear to be excessive,
as the 50% marginal tax rate comes into effect at an
annual income of 60,000 pesos, which is only about
$US 3,000.
A third feature of the tax system is that a maximum
deduction of 10% from gross income is permitted for
the purchase of inputs when determining taxable income.
In other words, net income for tax purposes or “taxable
income” is always considered to be 90% of gross in-
come, regardless of the real value of purchased inputs.
The only exception is in transportation, where the maxi-
mum deduction for purchased inputs is 20% (ONAT, 1997,
p. 6). In this article, this is termed the “10% Maximum
Cost Deductibility Rule”. This feature of the tax system
is problematic in that those micro-enterprises which face
high costs for purchased inputs are in effect being taxed
on these purchases. This means that the true tax rate on
value added by the firm in its actual net revenues can be
much higher than the rates shown in table 3, which show
the true rates only for a micro-enterprise with actual costs
of purchased inputs amounting to 10% of gross revenues.
What proportion of micro-enterprises have net rev-
enue equal to or more than 90% of gross revenue? Per-
haps a significant proportion. Many micro-enterprises
involve labour-intensive activities with minimal equip-
ment or purchased material inputs. The following mi-
cro-enterprises may be of this type: messengers, bicycle
guards, child care, building attendant, manicurist, mas-
seuse, shoe repair, domestic service, sports or language
instruction, and some repair services. On the other hand,
other activities (such as food vending, shoemakers, arti-
sans, flower cultivators and sellers, used book or record
sellers) involve the purchase and processing of substan-
tial amounts of material inputs. Some private restaurant
operators estimate their input costs as being above 60%
(Ritter, 1998b).
TABLE 3
Cuba: Scales of taxes applicable to personal income
Scale for income in pesos Scale for income in dollars
Tax bracket Tax rate (%) Amount of tax Tax bracket Tax rate (%) Amount of tax
(a) 0 – 3,000 5 0 – 2,400 10
(b) 3,000 – 6,000 10 2,400 – 6,000 12
(c) 6,000 – 12,000 15 6,000 – 9,600 15
(d) 12,000 – 18,000 20 9,600 – 13,200 20
(e) 18,000 – 24,000 25 13,200 – 18,000 25
(f) 24,000 – 36,000 30 18,000 – 24,000 30
(g) 36,000 – 48,000 35 24,000 – 36,000 35
(h) 48,000 – 60,000 40 36,000 – 48,000 40
(i) 60 000  or more 50 48,000 – 60,000 45
60 000 or more 50
Source: ONAT (1997, p. 1); Ministerio de Finanzas y Precios (1996).
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2. The rationale for the current tax regime
There are three factors which explain the adoption of
this tax regime. First, when self-employment was legal-
ized in September 1993, prices, revenues and net profits
were often exceedingly high. This was the result of the
excess purchasing power in the hands of citizens (be-
cause the government was financing a large deficit –about
28% of GDP in 1993– through the creation of money,
while prices in the State sector were fixed at low levels)
and the limited number of micro-enterprises which ini-
tially existed. The imposition of the tax regime and the
escalation of tax rates were therefore designed to remove
a substantial proportion of this income for equity rea-
sons. It may be noted again, however, that a majority of
the micro-enterprises are involved in the provision of
simple goods and services for low-income Cubans in the
peso economy and generate only modest incomes, al-
beit probably higher than the average for State employ-
ees.
Second, the micro-enterprise tax regime was estab-
lished at a time when there was not yet a well-estab-
lished administration for this type of taxation. Nor had
there been an established and transparent tax system or
a generalized habit of paying taxes, because the tax rates
and payments had previously been hidden. Moreover,
prior to the legalization of micro-enterprises, many such
firms had operated on a clandestine basis, avoiding tax
payments and other types of regulations. The tax system
which was implemented seems to have been designed to
enforce a high level of compliance in a context in which
non-compliance (in the underground economy) previ-
ously had been the norm and in which there had been no
established practice of paying taxes openly.
Third, there was a significant amount of theft of
products from the State sector of the economy, especially
in the 1990s. A proportion of these found their way to
the micro-enterprise sector as production inputs. One of
the novel elements of the tax system –the 10% limit on
the deduction from taxable income for purchased inputs–
appears to have been designed to handle this situation. If
it were impossible to know for sure the true value of
purchased inputs, it would be risky to permit micro-
enterprises to calculate their own input costs for deter-
mining taxable income. It was administratively easier to
simply declare a maximum of 10% of gross income for
purchased inputs for all micro-enterprises, regardless of
their true level of such purchases.
A popular view among own-account entrepreneurs
is that the tax system is designed to punish them for ideo-
logical reasons and ultimately put them out of business.
This is indeed a possibility, and there are statements by
the leadership which seem to support this view. The heavy
reliance on regulations and the severe punishment for
“infractions” also suggests that this is the case. It is not
likely that the current micro-enterprise tax regime was
designed to kill the micro-enterprise sector, however: in
reality, it was probably designed to collect taxes in a dif-
ficult environment in which open and transparent tax-
paying was not the established practice.
3. A quantitative analysis of the micro-enterprise
tax regime
There are two complications which are encountered when
analysing the micro-enterprise tax regime: first, the ad-
vance lump-sum tax, and second, the requirement in the
income tax act that net income for tax purposes must
always be fixed at 90% of gross income. To analyse the
implications of these factors for the micro-enterprise tax
regime, a step-by step approach is used here. First, a brief
mathematical description is given of the relationship
between (i) the “true” tax rate and (ii) the value added
by the micro-enterprise (or conversely the value of pur-
chased inputs as a percentage of total revenue). The im-
plications of the advance tax payments combined with
the tax scale are then analysed, using a graphical pre-
sentation.
The relationship between the “true tax rate” which
is imposed on the micro-enterprise and the value of the
inputs purchased by the micro-enterprise (or its net value
added) is analysed below, beginning with a mathemati-
cal derivation of that relationship:
Definitions:
c: Percentage of gross income used for
purchasing inputs
GY: Gross income
GYk(1-0.1): Officially determined tax brackets:
GYk(1-c): True value added or net income for tax
bracket
NYk: Taxable income for tax bracket
TNYk: True net income for tax bracket
Tk: Tax rate for specific tax bracket
Mk: Amount of tax payment in tax bracket
NAYk: Net after-tax income in tax bracket
Vk = Mk/TNYk: Tax rate as % of true net income in tax
bracket
True net income is defined as gross income less the cost
of purchased inputs, i.e., net value added:
TNYk = GYk * (1-c) [1]
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Taxable income is defined by the tax legislation as
gross income less 10% for purchased inputs (regardless
of the true value of those purchases): i.e., net value added
for tax purposes is always considered to be 90% of gross
income:
NYk = GYk * (1-0.1) = GYk*0.9 [2]
The amount of the tax payable is therefore the tax rate
for the relevant tax bracket times the taxable income for
that bracket:
Mk = (Tk/100) * NYk [3]
From [2], we have:
Gyk = NYk/0.9 [4]
and, substituting [4] in [1],
TNY = (NY/0.9) * (1-c) [5]
or, TNYk = (NYk/0.9) * (1-c) [6]
Thus, for a given value of c there is a corresponding value
of TNYk for every value of NYk:
Vk = Mk/TNYk [7]
i.e., the actual tax rate is the tax payment divided by the
true net income for each tax bracket.
Then, substituting [3] in [7]:
Vk = {(Tk/100) * NYk} / TNYk [8]
Again, substituting [6] in [8],
Vk = {(Tk/100) * NYk} / {(NYk/0.9) * (1-c)}
or,
Vk =
(Tk/100) * 0.9 [9]
(1-c)
Using the relationship of equation [9], the official ONAT
tax scale given in table 3 is adjusted so as to represent
the true tax rates on true net income. This gives table 4,
section A of which shows the revised tax brackets in terms
of true net income and the tax rates as proportions of
true net income. Then, when different values are assigned
to c, this gives different tax rates and brackets. In table
4, the revised scales and tax rates are presented for val-
ues of c of 10%, 40%, and 60%.
The rapid escalation of the true marginal tax rate is
apparent in table 4. For the case of true net value added
of 40% (i.e., c = 0.6), the highest tax bracket reaches
112.5%. This occurs at tax bracket (i), at a level of tax-
able income of 60,000 pesos or 26,667 pesos in terms of
true net income.
If the “10% rule” were abolished so that every
micro-enterprise could deduct its real costs of purchased
inputs from taxable income, then the official tax scale
would represent the true burden of the tax system on the
micro-entrepreneur. As it stands, however, the official
scale understates the true tax burden for all those micro-
enterprises with purchased inputs exceeding 10% of gross
revenues.
The lump-sum tax payments can be examined us-
ing the three cases presented in sections B, C and D of
table 4, with purchased inputs accounting for 10%, 40%,
and 60% respectively of gross income. These three cases
are illustrated in figures 1, 2 and 3. The third case is
explained in detail below, with only a quick reference to
the other two.
In figure 3, with gross income on the horizontal axis
and the percentage of gross revenues on the vertical axis,
the horizontal line at the 60% level indicates that 60% of
gross income is always expended on the purchase of in-
puts. The true value added, then, is the 40% of gross
revenues lying above the 60% line. The escalating mar-
ginal tax rates for the sequential tax brackets are repre-
sented by the step-like tax rate function. The area be-
tween this function and the 60% line represents the tax
payable by the micro-enterprise, while the area above
the tax rate function but below the 100% line represents
the after-tax net revenues retained by the micro-enter-
prise. It can be seen that the tax rate function escalates
rapidly and exceeds 100% at the last tax bracket (66,667
pesos per year and above). The tax rate function esca-
lates quickly due to the fact that the tax is levied on 90%
of the gross revenues, but the micro-enterprise only re-
ceives 40% of the gross revenues as net income.
The additional complication arises because the
micro-enterprises must pay the lump-sum taxes in ad-
vance. We will consider here the example of a private
restaurant in the peso economy. For this case, and on an
annual basis, the amount of the lump sum tax could be
620 pesos per month, or 7440 pesos per year (400 pesos
lump sum plus 100 pesos “alcohol tax” plus 120 pesos
for a minimum of two registered workers, or 620 pesos
per month) (see table 2). The area representing the lump-
sum tax in figure 3 shows that a gross income of 18,600
pesos is required to generate enough net revenues (40%
of the gross income) to pay the tax. However, the lump-
sum taxes already paid can be deducted from the tax
payable according to the tax scale. This means that no
additional taxes need to be paid until the total tax pay-
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TABLE 4
Cuba: Calculation of tax rates for effective net incomes
with different levels of purchased inputs (or net value added)
A.  When c represents purchased inputs as % of gross income
Tax brackets as effective net income (pesos) Tax rate for effective net income (%)
From To
(a) 3,000 x (1-c)(-1) 0.9 0.05 x (1-c)(-1) 0.9
(b) 3,000 x (1-c)(-1) 0.9 6,000 x (1-c)(-1) 0.9 0.10 x (1-c)(-1) 0.9
(c) 6,000 x (1-c)(-1) 0.9 12,000 x (1-c)(-1) 0.9 0.15 x (1-c)(-1) 0.9
(d) 12,000 x (1-c)(-1) 0.9 18,000 x (1-c)(-1) 0.9 0.20 x (1-c)(-1) 0.9
(e) 18,000 x (1-c)(-1) 0.9 24,000 x (1-c)(-1) 0.9 0.25 x (1-c)(-1) 0.9
(f) 24,000 x (1-c)(-1) 0.9 36,000 x (1-c)(-1) 0.9 0.30 x (1-c)(-1) 0.9
(g) 36,000 x (1-c)(-1) 0.9 48,000 x (1-c)(-1) 0.9 0.35 x (1-c)(-1) 0.9
(h) 48,000 x (1-c)(-1) 0.9 60,000 x (1-c)(-1) 0.9 0.40 x (1-c)(-1) 0.9
(i) 60,000 x (1-c)(-1) 0.9 0.50 x (1-c)(-1) 0.9
B. When c = 10%
Tax brackets as effective net income (pesos) Tax rate (%)
From To
(a) 0 3,000 5
(b) 3,000 6,000 10
(c) 6,000 12,000 15
(d) 12,000 18,000 20
(e) 18,000 24,000 25
(f) 24,000 36,000 30
(g) 36,000 48,000 35
(h) 48,000 60,000 40
(i) 60,000 50
C. When c = 40%
Tax brackets as effective net income (pesos) Tax rate (%)
From To
(a) 0 2,000 7.5
(b) 2,000 4,000 15.0
(c) 4,000 8,000 22.5
(d) 8,000 12,000 30.0
(e) 12,000 16,000 37.5
(f) 16,000 24,000 45.0
(g) 24,000 32,000 52.5
(h) 32,000 40,000 60.0
(i) 40,000 75.0
D. When c = 60%
Tax brackets as effective net income (pesos) Tax rate (%)
From To
(a) 0 1,333 11.3
(b) 1,333 2,667 22.5
(c) 2,667 5,333 33.8
(d) 5,333 8,000 45.0
(e) 8,000 10,667 56.3
(f) 10,667 16,000 67.5
(g) 16,000 21,333 78.8
(h) 21,333 26,667 90.0
(i) 26,667 112.5
Source: Section A is based on equation [9] and table 3. The calculations in sections B, C and D are based on section A.
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able according to the scale reaches the lump-sum tax
payment. In this case, the level of gross income at which
the taxes payable equal the lump-sum payments is 39,743
pesos, at point e.
The coexistence of the deductible lump-sum tax with
the tax payable according to the tax scale produces a
curious pattern of marginal tax rates. Instead of the rates
depicted by the step-like tax function, the effective mar-
ginal tax rate (MTR) function follows the line abcdef. For
the first 18,600 pesos of gross income, the MTR on net
income is 100% (this is an MTR in the sense that within
this range of its gross income, the micro-enterprise must
pay 100% of its net income as taxes, on a month by month
basis). However, the MTR then falls to 0.0% from c to d
for that portion of gross income on which no additional
tax needs to be paid because it has already been paid via
the lump-sum tax. Only after an income level of 39,743
pesos is passed, at point e, does the tax scale again be-
come effective.
This pattern of marginal tax rates cannot fail to have
a variety of impacts on micro-enterprise behaviour. When
the lump-sum tax is included in the picture, as shown in
figure 3, it can be seen that the net after-tax revenues in
this case include only the area above line bcdef and be-
low the 100% line. The possibilities for this micro-en-
terprise to earn sufficient net revenues to survive appear
to be limited.
The calculations for the case illustrated in figure 3
are shown in table 5. In this table, column 1 shows the
tax brackets defined in terms of gross income, less the
allowable 10% deduction for purchased inputs. Column
2 then shows the true gross income applicable to the tax
brackets. In column 4, the true net income for each tax
bracket is presented, taking into consideration an as-
sumed 60% cost for purchased inputs. With the tax rates
of column 5, the tax payments are calculated in column
6, noting that the gross income (less 10% for purchased
inputs) is what is actually taxed. The tax payments of
column 6 are then presented as proportions of true net
income (from column 4) to give the actual or true tax
rate (shown in column 10). In column 7, net after-tax
income is calculated as true net income less the tax pay-
ments made (column 6). The net after-tax income is then
calculated in column 8 as a percentage of gross income
(from column 2), and next, in column 9, as a percentage
of true net income (the complications of the lump-sum
payments are not included in this table).
In this case, the escalation of the marginal tax rates
as proportions of the true net income is dramatic. With
true net income equal to only 40% of gross income, the
tax scale reaches high levels quickly. By the eighth tax
FIGURE 2
Effective tax rates with lump-sum payment
(of 620 pesos per month or 7,440 per year) and true net
value added at 60% of gross revenues
(c=0.4)
FIGURE 1
Effective tax rates with lump-sum payment
(of 620 pesos per month or 7,440 per year) with true net
value added at 90% of gross revenues
(c=0.1)
FIGURE 3
Effective tax rates with lump-sum payment
(of 620 pesos per month or 7,440 per year) and true net










































































C: Effective marginal tax rate
A: Purchased input cost








































































D: Effective average tax rate
B: Official tax scale
C: Effective marginal tax rate



































































C: Effective marginal tax
f
A: Purchased input cost
at 10% of gross revenues
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TABLE 5
Cuba: Calculation for determining real tax rates for an
effective net income of 40% of gross incomea
(c = 60%)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Tax bracket Gross income Taxable Effective Tax Amount Net Net Net Effective
income net income rate of tax income income income rate, %
after tax after tax, after tax,
as % of as % of
gross effective
income net income
GYk (1-.1) Gyk Nyk TNYk = Tk Mk = NAYk = NAYk/ NAYk/ Mk/
GYk (1-c) TkxNYk TNYk–Mk GYk TNYk TNYk
(a) 0 – 3,000 0 – 3,333 3,000 1,333.3 .05 .05x3,000=150 1,183.3 0.355 0.887 11.3
(b) 3,000 – 6,000 3,333 – 6,667 3,000 1,333.3 .10 .10x3,000=300 1,033.3 0.31 0.775 22.5
(c) 6,000 – 12,000 6,667 – 13,333 6,000 2,666.7 .15 900 1,766.7 0.265 0.663 33.8
(d) 12,000 – 18,000 13,333 – 20,000 6,000 2,666.7 .20 1,200 1,466.7 0.22 0.55 45.0
(e) 18,000 – 24,000 20,000 – 26,667 6,000 2,666.7 .25 1,500 1,166.7 0.175 0.44 56.3
(f) 24,000 – 36,000 26,667 – 40,000 12,000 5,333.3 .30 3,600 1,733.3 0.13 0.325 67.5
(g) 36,000 – 48,000 40,000 – 53,333 12,000 5,333.3 .35 4,200 1,133.3 0.085 0.21 78.8
(h) 48,000 – 60,000 53,333 – 66,667 12,000 5,333.3 .40 4,800 533.3 0.04 0.10 90.0
(i) 60,000 – 100,000 66,667 – 111,111 40,000 17,777.8 .50 20,000 –2,222.2 –0.05 –0.125 112.5
Source: Calculations by the author.
a
  Assuming that c = 0.6, i.e., that purchased inputs equal 60% of gross income. For definitions of the terms used, see page 145.
bracket, 96% of every peso earned goes to input-suppli-
ers and the tax authority, and in the last tax bracket the
tax payable reaches 112.5% of true net income, so that
net after-tax income is negative.
The case of actual input purchases of 10% is illus-
trated in figure 1. This case presents no complications as
the true net income is equal to the taxable income permit-
ted by the official tax scale of the tax legislation, that is,
allowing for a 10% deduction from gross income for pur-
chased inputs. For this case, the tax rates applied by the
tax scale are in fact the same as the tax rates for true net
income. An intermediate case, in which input purchases
equal 40% of gross income, is presented in figure 2.
Without presenting other possible cases, it can be
concluded that the higher the level of purchased inputs
by the micro-enterprise (or in other words, the lower the
true net value added by the firm), the more onerous is
the true tax burden. The tax rates do not appear abnor-
mal for those enterprises with purchased inputs around
10% (true net income or value added as a proportion of
gross income of 90%), and especially for those with even
lower relative values of purchased inputs. However, as
the level of value added or true net income as a propor-
tion of gross income declines, the average tax rates be-
gin to increase rapidly and ultimately become impos-
sible.
When the lump-sum tax is included in the analy-
sis, the average tax rate (ATR) is high at first, reflecting
the advance nature of the payment (the ATR function is
measured from the cost line upwards). As can be seen
in each of figures 1, 2, and 3, the average tax rate de-
clines up to the point where the official tax rate be-
comes effective at point e in each of the figures. The
ATR schedule is especially important as a measure of
the tax burden, as it shows what percentage of gross
income is paid as taxes (from the cost line upwards).
Thus the declining ATR and MTR indicate that the inci-
dence of the tax system is regressive: i.e., the tax is
higher for low income earners and declines as income
rises up to e in the figures.
A final feature of the lump-sum tax, not illustrated
in the figures, is that as the advance lump-sum tax pay-
ment increases in magnitude, the point at which the offi-
cial tax scale becomes effective shifts towards the right
in figures 2 and 3. This means that as the lump-sum pay-
ments increase, the tax system, which is regressive from
the beginning, becomes even more so, with higher tax
rates imposed on lower income earners.
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V
Implications for equity, efficiency and viability
The tax administration is not unaware of the lost
revenues and uses inspectors and the “Comités por la
Defensa de la Revolución” (CDRs) to try to prevent en-
terprises from operating in the underground economy.
However, clandestine micro-enterprise is widespread and
the members of the CDRs (which include most people)
are often also involved in the underground economy, so
that controlling it is difficult.
Despite the ostensible progressiveness of the offi-
cial tax scale or schedule, the tax structure is in fact re-
gressive for the lower and middle income micro-enter-
prises. Because the lump-sum tax creates a 100%
marginal tax rate for the first amount of income earned,
followed by a 0% marginal rate, relatively lower net in-
comes in this range are taxed more heavily than higher
incomes. The average tax rate declines as income in-
creases up to the level where the official tax scale be-
comes effective (point e in the figures). This result is
inequitable, in that lower incomes are taxed more heavily
than higher incomes in this range.
2. The micro-enterprise sectoral level
The tax regime is also inequitable in terms of its impacts
among micro-enterprises. Because of the “10% maxi-
mum cost deductibility rule”, firms with higher levels of
purchased inputs pay higher marginal and average tax
rates in terms of their net income than other firms with
the same net incomes but lower levels of purchased in-
puts. A second element of unfairness is that the tax struc-
ture discriminates against new entrants to any part of the
sector, because the marginal tax rate is initially 100%,
due to the fixed monthly lump-sum tax. New entrants
must earn revenues immediately which would permit
them to pay these taxes, whereas established micro-
enterprises are more likely to have reached income lev-
els which permit them to attain the range of gross in-
come where the marginal tax rate is 0%. Thus they have
an advantage which shields them in part from new com-
petition by helping to keep out new firms.
From the standpoint of the micro-enterprise sector,
the tax regime also results in a variety of inefficiencies.
By creating a high barrier to entry because of the 100%
marginal tax rate, the number of new firms entering the
sector is reduced. High levels of uncertainty and risk for
The micro-enterprise tax regime has a variety of impacts
in terms of fairness, the efficiency of the economic sys-
tem and the viability of the tax collection system itself.
These impacts are explored here at the levels of the mi-
cro-enterprise, the micro-enterprise sector, and Cuba’s
society and economy more broadly.
1. The micro-enterprise level
First, the lump-sum payments involve a marginal tax rate
of 100% of true net earnings up to the level of income
that covers them, at which point the marginal tax rate
falls to 0% (point c in figures 1, 2 and 3). This 0% rate
prevails until gross income reaches the level at which
the tax payable under the official tax scale –but deduct-
ible in an amount equal to the lump-sum payments– is
just equal to the total of the latter. At this point (e in the
figures) the official tax scale becomes effective again.
When faced with this pattern of marginal tax rates,
the micro-enterprise will very likely try to avoid paying
the higher tax rates. It will try to locate itself as close as
possible to point d in figures 1, 2, and 3 (the highest
levels of income with a marginal tax rate of 0%) by earn-
ing gross income just below that point. This will be es-
pecially relevant for those micro-enterprises facing high
levels of purchased inputs (the case analysed in figure
3), where the marginal tax rate jumps from 0% to 67.5%
at point e. It can do this by restricting its output to this
level and/or under-declaring income. If the firm restricts
its output, society loses the goods and services forgone,
the micro-enterprise sector loses income, and the gov-
ernment loses tax revenue. If, on the other hand, the mi-
cro-enterprise tries to under-declare its income, the gov-
ernment likewise loses tax revenue.
With the high barrier to entry created by the 100%
initial marginal tax rate, some micro-enterprises may re-
frain from registering and may decide to operate on a
clandestine basis. There can be no doubt that this has
occurred in Cuba. Numerous tradesmen undertake house
repairs; private car owners provide occasional taxi ser-
vices, despite the risks involved; some households pro-
vide unofficial rented accommodation, and many people
provide personal services unofficially. In this case, the
government loses tax revenue, and indeed it may lose its
tax base if the number of micro-enterprises diminishes.
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new entrants also serve as a barrier keeping out potential
new participants. Therefore, there may be less legal com-
petition, higher prices, and lower volumes of production
than if these barriers to entry were lower. On the other
hand, for some other types of micro-enterprise where
entrance into the clandestine economy is easier, the re-
sult may be increased competition from tax-evading sup-
pliers of certain goods and services operating at lower
costs.
The “10% rule” also has negative effects in terms of
efficiency. Because of the high true taxation levels for
those micro-enterprises which have higher levels of pur-
chased inputs, the volume of production of goods and
services from these firms is probably unduly low. The
prices of their outputs also are probably unduly high,
reflecting the high tax burden but not necessarily reflect-
ing the real efficiency and true costs of production of
such firms.
There is an additional negative effect of the “10%
rule.” As an economy evolves, there is normally increas-
ing articulation of production among enterprises as they
become more specialized and as inter-enterprise trade
expands. With the “10% rule”, however, there is a disin-
centive for a micro-enterprise to make purchases from
other enterprises, as the tax treatment of such purchases
is so harsh. The result is that enterprises try to avoid pur-
chases of inputs from other firms. On an economy-wide
basis, this would block the evolution of specialization
among firms and inter-enterprise exchange.
3. The implications for society
Taxation of the micro-enterprise sector is necessary from
the standpoint of equity. This sector, like all others, must
pay its share of the cost of providing public goods and
services. It was difficult to know what a fair level of taxa-
tion for the sector was, at a time when it was only just
getting established. This is because, at least for a transi-
tional period, the incomes earned in the sector were high
for a number of reasons mentioned in section IV.2 . The
high taxation rates in real terms –in relation to true net
incomes in the sector– reflected the desire to tap these
high incomes for both revenue-raising and social justice
reasons.
From a social perspective, however, it is inequitable
to tax those with lower incomes more heavily than those
with higher incomes, yet this is precisely what the lump-
sum tax does in the lower ranges of micro-enterprise in-
comes –those ranges where perhaps a large proportion
of the firms are operating. It is also inequitable to tax
micro-entrepreneurs or anyone else with the same net
incomes at different rates, but this is what the 10% rule
achieves.
Perhaps one of the most disturbing inequities of the
micro-enterprise tax regime is that it is more onerous
than the tax regime facing foreign companies operating
in joint venture arrangements with Cuban State firms.
The contrasting tax regimes are summarized in table 6,
from which it is clear that while foreign enterprises in
joint venture arrangements receive fairly normal tax treat-
ment from a comparative international perspective, their
treatment is much more favourable than that given to
domestically-owned and oriented micro-enterprises.
The tax regime for micro-enterprises runs counter
to the rationality of resource allocation and consequently
lowers living standards. First, the onerous levels of taxa-
tion inherent in the tax regime lead enterprises to go out
of business, or in some cases to restrict their own pro-
duction in order to avoid higher tax brackets. Both of
these results reduce the volume of goods and services
TABLE 6
Cuba: Comparison of tax regime for Cuban micro-enterprises with
that applicable to foreign firms operating under joint ventures
Micro-enterprise sector Joint ventures
Effective tax rates Can exceed 100% of net income 30% of net income (50% for mining and
petroleum sectors)
Effective tax base 90% of gross income Net income after deduction of costs
Possibility of deducting investments Not deductible from taxable income Fully deductible from taxable income
Lump-sum taxes Compulsory advance lump-sum tax payments None
Return of excess tax paid No returns Not applicable
“Tax holidays” No Yes
Repatriation of profits No Yes
Source:  Analysis by the author.
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produced in the sector and raise prices. Second, the
micro-enterprise tax regime restricts entry into the sector,
thereby restricting competition, reducing output and rais-
ing prices. Third, the fact that some micro-enterprises
go underground or that many self-employed micro-
entrepreneurs avoid registering and paying taxes also re-
sults in inefficiencies of resource use. Such enterprises
must operate on a very small scale and continuously “un-
der cover”. This probably lowers the quality of their prod-
ucts and increases their prices in comparison with those
firms operating legally (even allowing for the impact of
taxes on the prices charged by legal micro-enterprises).
By blocking the entry of new micro-enterprises and
promoting the exit of existing ones, the tax regime also
reduces productive employment and the generation of
income (open unemployment was stated to be 6.8% in
1996, while the open-unemployment equivalent of “un-
deremployment” was estimated by the United Nations
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Car-
ibbean at 27.3% in the same year (ECLAC, Subregional
Headquarters in Mexico, 1997, p. 378). This latter fig-
ure emphasizes the loss to the nation due to labour under-
utilization).
One surprising result of the micro-enterprise tax re-
gime is the discrimination inherent in it against domesti-
cally-oriented economic activity or domestic “value
added”. Micro-enterprises have little or no access to
imported inputs except those acquired from recycled
materials, or purchases from the dollar stores or special
State sellers of inputs. The effective exchange rate for
them in 1998 was approximately 20 pesos for each US
dollar of imported inputs (plus taxes of 140% normally).
For enterprises in the State sector, on the other hand,
one US dollar of imported inputs costs only 1 peso, when
the importation has been approved by the planning au-
thorities. This means that State enterprises can obtain
access to imports much more cheaply than micro-enter-
prises. The result of this is that often micro-enterprises
use domestically available inputs to a higher degree than
the State enterprises. An example of this occurs with the
private restaurants, where close to 100% of all of the
inputs are of Cuban origin, in contrast to the State fast-
food chains such as “Burgui” (a Burger King look-alike),
which import almost everything: tables, potatoes, ham-
burgers, chicken, trays, paper cups, and many special-
ized building materials. The current tax regime, in dis-
criminating against micro-enterprises, thus discriminates
against domestic value added and in favour of the more
import-intensive State firms.
4. Implications for tax system viability
The micro-enterprise tax regime has some important
implications for the functioning and viability of the
general tax system, since it leads to reduced revenues
in comparison with a more normal type of tax re-
gime:
i) Because the true tax rates are so high for micro-
enterprises with higher levels of purchased inputs,
some firms are put out of business, leading to loss
of revenue.
ii) When faced with high real tax rates, some micro-
enterprises cease legal operation and enter the un-
derground economy.
iii) Because the true level of the marginal tax rate is so
high when it becomes applicable to those micro-
enterprises with higher levels of purchased inputs,
they have an incentive to under-declare their gross
income, leading to revenue losses for the government.
iv) Because of the high lump-sum taxes, when contem-
plating the establishment of a new micro-enterprise
or re-registering an established one, some potential
micro-entrepreneurs may enter the clandestine
economy or refrain from starting or continuing their
business.
The perception that the micro-enterprise tax regime is
unfair and excessively onerous has resulted in high lev-
els of non-compliance. Indeed, some micro-enterprises
can only survive through non-compliance, especially if
they are unable to retreat to the underground economy
due to a location or profile incompatible with clandes-
tine operations. Some micro-enterprises may under-
declare their incomes.
The result of the character of the tax system and the
non-compliance it engenders is that the tax system lacks
credibility and respect. Rather than leading to the gradual
development of a “tax culture” in which people willingly
and honestly pay their taxes, the system has provoked
the habit of cheating. To some extent this is part of
people’s survival strategies in the difficult circumstances
of the late 1990s. The nature of the tax regime leads some
people to think that tax evasion is not unethical even if it
is illegal.
In the long term, it may be difficult to change the
current “culture of tax evasion” to one of compliance.
This could continue to be a problem even after a rea-
sonable micro-enterprise tax regime has been estab-
lished.
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Build up the credibility of the tax system
At present, the tax regime is perceived to be unfair and
unreasonable, so that cheating and non-compliance seem
to be morally acceptable as well as necessary for sur-
vival. Any policies which would help to build up the cred-
ibility of the tax system would therefore be desirable.
Some such changes could include reasonable financial
penalties for tax evasion and the refunding to micro-
entrepreneurs of overpayments of tax. The return to le-
gality of some economic activities which had previously
gone underground or remained in that situation would
also help make the system fairer by reducing the num-
ber of unregistered micro-enterprises able to completely
evade taxes.
Recommendation 4:
Lower the barriers to entry into the micro-enterprise sector
A further set of changes concerns the large number of
rules and regulations mentioned in section III. These were
designed to contain the sector, to limit incomes in the
sector, and perhaps to provide protection to some State
enterprises. This policy environment provides an incen-
tive for micro-enterprises to remain underground, with a
variety of harmful consequences as discussed earlier. The
solution, however, is not to impose still more regulations.
Instead, it would probably be wiser to lower the barriers
to entry into the legal micro-enterprise sector. This would
involve dropping many of the restrictions on micro-
enterprises and permitting most applicants for entry into
the sector to effectively enter it. It would involve changes
in the structure of incentives, which currently encour-
age micro-enterprises to remain in the underground
economy or go out of business.
If the entry barriers are lowered and the incentive
structure is changed so as not to penalize legality, the
number of micro-enterprises will increase. With increased
competition in the sector, production will increase and
prices will decline, while the average income level of
the micro-entrepreneurs will approach the national av-
erage. Employment in the sector should increase, while
it should go down in the underground economy. Finally,
the tax revenues actually collected by the tax system
should increase.
There are a number of changes in the tax regime which,
if adopted, could reduce or eliminate some of the more
harmful effects of the micro-enterprise tax regime. Some
of them are quite simple and could be implemented
quickly. Others are more complicated and would take
longer to generate positive results.
Recommendation 1:
Establish a normal tax base
The first change might be to establish net income
rather than gross income as the tax base. This means
abolishing the “10% rule”, which limits the allowable
deduction from taxable income to a maximum of 10%
of gross income. This would improve the equity of
the system and end the discrimination against those
micro-enterprises with purchased inputs exceeding
10% of gross income. By making the tax regime fairer
in this way, non-compliance would be reduced and
tax collection facilitated. This change would permit
an expansion of output of the micro-enterprises which
are more dependent on larger proportions of purchased
inputs.
Recommendation 2:
Eliminate the advance lump-sum tax payments
The elimination of the fixed monthly payments would
have a variety of positive results. It would remove a bar-
rier to the entry of new enterprises, thereby increasing
the number of firms, intensifying competition, increas-
ing output and reducing prices in the sector. This would
also, in time, lead to an increase rather than a decrease
in tax revenues, which would grow as more micro-
enterprises entered the sector and as more micro-enter-
prises surfaced from the underground economy because
of the elimination of the high cost, risk and uncertainty
created by the lump-sum taxes. Moreover, elimination
of these tax payments would also eliminate some of the
more obviously unfair aspects of the tax regime. No
longer would the incidence of the tax in the lower and
middle income ranges be regressive, and the non-
refundability of tax over-payments would no longer ex-
ist. Correction of these two inequities would help to es-
tablish the credibility of the tax regime, facilitate tax
compliance and reduce tax evasion.
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VII
Summary and conclusions
ing the generation of income. It discriminates against
domestic value-added in the micro-enterprise sector
which uses inputs almost entirely of domestic origin, in
contrast with the lower-taxed State sector which is highly
dependent on imported inputs and permits profit repa-
triation.
Although the tax regime is designed to collect rev-
enue from micro-enterprises, there are a number of ef-
fects which actually reduce the volume of taxes collected.
First, the lump-sum tax payment arrangement and the
high tax rates for those with purchases of inputs exceed-
ing 10% of gross revenues encourage firms to “go un-
derground” or to refrain from formally registering. The
size of the clandestine economy is immense, and the loss
of revenues comparably large. Thus, the nature of the
tax regime has bred a culture of tax evasion rather than
of compliance.
Some suggestions for improving the micro-enter-
prise tax system are presented in this article. First, a nor-
mal tax base should be established by eliminating the
“10% rule” and basing taxable income on gross revenues
less actual costs of production. Second, the advance
lump-sum tax payment should be cancelled. Third, com-
pliance with the tax regime in the long term should be
fostered by making the regime as fair and reasonable as
possible. Fourth, artificial policy-generated entry barri-
ers against new micro-enterprises should be dropped. A
more effective tax administration would also be neces-
sary to prevent abuse of an arrangement permitting the
deduction of costs from taxable income and the elimina-
tion of the advance lump-sum tax payments.
Generally, while the micro-enterprise sector must
pay its share of taxes, it should also have a tax regime
which is not more onerous than that facing joint ven-
tures and foreign firms and which is also equitable among
micro-enterprises themselves. A well-designed micro-
enterprise tax regime could help permit the sector to play
a more valuable role in the Cuban economy in terms of
employment, income generation, and the production of
needed goods and services at lower relative prices. It
could also generate more revenue than the current sys-
tem, which tends to drive micro-enterprises into clan-
destine status and tax evasion.
(Original: English)
Cuba’s tax regime for micro-enterprises has a number
of shortcomings which make it inequitable, which dam-
age the efficiency of resource allocation in the economy,
and which reduce the system’s effectiveness in collect-
ing revenue.
The problems with the tax regime stem mainly from
the “10% rule” and the character and size of the lump-
sum tax payments which must be made each month re-
gardless of actual income. The analysis made in this
article shows that the actual incidence of the tax is much
higher than the official tax scale when actual produc-
tion costs exceed the 10% maximum cost deductibility
rule. Indeed, for micro-enterprises with costs of pur-
chased inputs in the 60% range, the true marginal tax
rate on true net income (rather than gross income less
the maximum allowable 10%) can reach levels in ex-
cess of 100%. Moreover, the advance lump-sum tax
payments result in what are in effect marginal tax rates
of 100% for initial levels of revenue, after which the
marginal tax rate falls to 0% until the level of taxable
income is reached where taxes payable under the tax
scale are equal to the lump-sum payment. This creates
a pattern of declining marginal and average tax rates in
the lower and middle income ranges, so that the tax in
this range is regressive. The tax rates in the official tax
scale are also excessive for the vast majority of micro-
enterprises which operate in the peso rather than the
dollar economy.
From the standpoint of equity, the tax regime dis-
criminates against those micro-enterprises which have
costs of purchased inputs in excess of 10% of gross rev-
enues. It is regressive in that the tax rates are higher for
lower income micro-enterprises. It discriminates against
potential new entrants compared with established firms
because the former must pay the advance lump-sum taxes
before they have even started to earn revenues. Much of
the micro-enterprise sector also faces a more onerous
tax regime than foreign firms in joint venture arrange-
ments.
From the standpoint of its impact on the efficiency
of resource use in Cuban society, the tax regime has un-
fortunate results. It restricts the entry of new firms into
the sector and puts some firms out of business, thereby
reducing production, raising prices to Cuban citizens,
reducing employment in the sector and probably reduc-
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